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I start with three questions about our concepts of conscious states.  (1) How do I understand 
what it is for me to be in pain?  (2) How do I understand what it is for someone else to be in 
pain?  (3) Is the property of pain that I ascribe to others on the basis of what they say and do 
the same as the property I ascribe to myself without evidence? 
Wittgenstein’s response to those questions involves a general anti-platonism about 
properties or standards of similarity.  What it is for one thing to be similar to another, or to 
have the same property as another, he thinks, is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on 
our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody.  It comes more 
naturally to us to classify things in some ways than others.  But no property or standard of 
similarity is intrinsically or objectively more natural than any other: more natural simplicter.  
Wittgenstein’s view stands in sharp opposition to the contemporary doctrine of natural 
properties.1  For the natural properties view holds precisely that there is an objective 
hierarchy of naturalness amongst properties, a hierarchy that does not depend in any way on 
our concepts or practices. 
I want to explore the interaction between Wittgenstein’s position about sensations and 
sensation language and his anti-platonism.  Some anti-Wittgensteinian views in the 
philosophy of mind make essential appeal to the idea of natural properties.  What are the 
prospects for such views?  Do they pose a threat to a broadly Wittgensteinian position about 
sensations and sensation-language? 
 
 
1. Wittgenstein’s position and the rejection of natural properties 
One way of answering the questions with which we started involves what we might call the 
model of introspection and identity. On this view the answers to questions 1 and 2 are, in the 
broadest outline, as follows: 
1. I understand what it is for me to be in pain from the first-person case.  (As 
Wittgenstein puts this view: ‘it is only from my own case that I know what the word 
“pain” means’.2)  I single out a kind of sensation on the basis of how it feels in the 
first-person case, and I associate the word ‘pain’ with sensations of that 
introspectively-identified kind. 
2. I grasp what it is for someone else to be in pain by extension from the first-person 
case: what it is for someone else to be in pain is for her to be in the same kind of 
conscious state that I am in when I am in pain.  (As Wittgenstein puts the view: ‘if I 
suppose that someone else has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the 
same as I have so often had’.3)4 
                                                 
1  Locus classicus: David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
61 (1983) and “Putnam’s Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984).  For development and 
discussion see Theodore Sider, Writing the Book of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
2  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 4th edn., ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans. 
G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), §293. 
3  Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 
4  We shall see later how, on this approach, an answer to question 3 falls naturally out of the answer to question 
2. 
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Wittgenstein famously argues against both parts of that account: the idea that we can single 
out the property of pain by introspective ostension in the first-person case; and the idea that 
we can understand the word in third-person ascriptions by appeal to the idea of another 
person’s being in the same kind of state as me.  At both points, his argument essentially 
depends on his general opposition to the metaphysics of natural properties. 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to stage 1 of the introspection-and-identity model is a 
central aspect of the private language sections of Philosophical Investigations.  A crucial 
theme of those sections is that one cannot give meaning to a word for a kind of sensation by 
introspective ostension, in a way that does not rely on any links with behavior or external 
circumstances. That is the burden of Wittgenstein’s discussion of the private sensation diarist 
in Philosophical Investigations §258.  The point of that discussion, as I read it, is this.  In 
order to give a meaning to a word, I must establish a standard of correctness for uses of the 
word: a standard that distinguishes between a correct and an incorrect application of the 
word.  The private linguist thinks she can establish such a standard of correctness by 
concentrating her attention on the sensation she is having at a particular point and 
undertaking to use the word ‘S’ for all sensations of the same kind.  But, Wittgenstein asks, 
what is it for something else to be the same kind of sensation as this one?  There are 
indefinitely many different possible standards of similarity.  And no one way of classifying 
sensations as similar or different is any better, or more correct, than any other.  What it takes 
for one sensation to belong to the same kind as another is not determined by the nature of 
things; it has to be understood by reference to a humanly-created standard of similarity.  But 
in order for there to be a humanly-created standard of similarity, there has to be a practice of 
classification; a technique of applying a word.5  And the private linguist, Wittgenstein argues, 
cannot establish a classificatory practice by a one-off act of introspective association. 
 Wittgenstein’s argument depends on his general anti-platonist insistence that the 
world itself does not dictate what it takes for one thing to belong to the same kind as another.  
For suppose there is simply a fact of the matter, independent of our concepts and our 
practices of classification, about what it takes for one sensation to belong to the same kind as 
another.  In that case, there will similarly be a practice-independent fact of the matter about 
whether the sensation the private linguist has today is the same kind of sensation as the one 
she had yesterday when she introduced her word ‘S’.  So when the diarist attends 
introspectively to a particular sensation and says, ‘I shall use the word “S” to refer to 
sensations of the same kind as this one’, she will, pace Wittgenstein, thereby establish a 
standard of correctness for future applications of the word ‘S’.  Or so, at least, the property-
naturalist will argue. 
 We can trace a similar dialectic in connection with Wittgenstein’s opposition to stage 
2 of the introspection-and-identity model.  Suppose that, contrary to the private language 
sections, I do understand the word ‘pain’, in the first instance, solely on the basis of my 
introspective awareness of my own pain.  On the introspection-and-identity model, I then 
grasp what it is for someone else to be in pain by appeal to the principle that for someone else 
to be in pain is for her to be in the same kind of state that I am in when I am in pain.  
Wittgenstein famously rejects that idea: 
That gets us no further.  It is as if I were to say, ‘You surely know what “It’s 5 o’clock 
here” means; so you also know what “It’s 5 o’clock on the sun” means.  It means 
simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o’clock.’ – The 
explanation by means of sameness does not work here.  For I know well enough that 
one can call 5 o’clock here and 5 o’clock there ‘the same time’, but I do not know in 
what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.   
                                                 
5  For the point about a technique, in this context, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §262. 
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In exactly the same way, it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has 
a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For what’s surely clear to 
me is this part of the grammar: that one will say that the stove has the same 
experience as I if one says: it’s in pain and I’m in pain.6 
His point is this.  The principle, ‘for someone else to be in pain is for her to be in the same 
state that I am in when I am in pain’, is true.  But I cannot extract a conception of what it is 
for someone else to be in pain merely from the principle about sameness of state, by itself.  
For there are indefinitely many different possible states of S that could count as S’s being in 
the same state that I’m in when I feel pain.  Appealing to the notion of sameness of state, 
then, is not by itself enough to specify what it takes for S to be in pain; I need some 
substantive understanding of what it takes for S to be in the same state as me. 
As before, Wittgenstein’s position depends on his anti-platonism.  For suppose there 
are natural properties. Then, it seems, we can appeal to sameness of property in explaining 
what it is for someone else to be in pain.   For in that case the explanation, ‘for S to be in pain 
is for her to be in the same state that I am in when I’m in pain’, does single out a definite 
condition for the truth of ‘S is in pain’. 
 
2. Peacocke on concepts of conscious states 
Christopher Peacocke has offered an account of our concepts of conscious states that directly 
challenges Wittgenstein’s view by endorsing a version of the natural properties view and 
accepting the model of introspection-and-identity.7  Examining that account is a helpful way 
to explore the issues about natural properties and sensation concepts. 
According to Peacocke, our grasp of the concept pain is ‘anchored’ in the first-person 
case: in our awareness of our own feelings of pain.  At a first pass, Peacocke’s proposal is 
that possessing the concept pain involves two things: 
(i) knowing what it is like to feel pain; 
(ii) having tacit knowledge that for someone else to be in pain is for them to be in 
the same conscious state that one is in oneself when one is in pain. 
But that is only a first pass.  To understand the idea of someone else being in the same 
conscious state that I am in when I am in pain, I must grasp the idea of someone other than 
myself being a subject of experience at all.  And in Peacocke’s view, just as my grasp of the 
concept pain is anchored in my knowledge of what it is like to be in pain, so my grasp of the 
concept conscious subject is anchored in my knowledge of what it is like to be a conscious 
subject.  He holds, further, that the concepts conscious state and conscious subject are 
interdependent: a conscious state is, in its nature, a state of a conscious subject; and a 
conscious subject is, in its nature, a thing that has conscious states.  In line with that 
interdependence, Peacocke’s full view is that grasping the concept pain involves satisfying 
this more complex condition: 
(i) knowing what it is like to feel pain; 
(ii*) having tacit knowledge that for someone else to be in pain is (a) for them to be 
something of the same kind as me (a subject); and also (b) for them to be in 
the same state I’m in when I’m in pain.8 
In what follows, I shall ignore this complication, and focus just on the simple account given 
by clauses (i) and (ii) above.  But we should remember that Peacocke’s full account is more 
complex. 
 We can note three important features of this account.  First, Peacocke’s idea is that 
one’s grasp of what it is for someone else to be in pain is explained by one’s grasp of what it 
                                                 
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §350. 
7 Christopher Peacocke, Truly Understood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 5. 
8 For this formulation, see Peacocke, Truly Understood, 175. 
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is for one to be in pain oneself, together with knowledge of the identity.  As I have said, 
Wittgenstein does not deny that, when S is in pain, S is in the same state that I am in when I 
am in pain.  What he denies is that we can appeal to that identity in explaining what it is for S 
to be in pain.  But that is precisely what Peacocke thinks we can do: his account deliberately 
and explicitly rejects this Wittgensteinian view. 
Second, as Peacocke stresses, his account assumes a doctrine of natural properties.9  
Mental properties, he thinks, are ‘properties in their own right’; they do not need to be 
reduced to anything else in order to count as genuine properties.  By the same token, the 
notion of identity of conscious state across different subjects is ‘a notion in good standing’ 
which does not require ‘further elaboration, in terms of functional role’ or anything else.  So 
to grasp the idea of someone else being in the same conscious state that I am in when I am in 
pain, I do not need any further specification of what it takes for someone to be in the same 
conscious state as that.  To see why Peacocke’s account requires this sort of naturalism about 
properties, suppose that the natural properties view were false; so, considered in itself, any 
conscious state in someone else would have an equally good claim to be counted the same 
kind of conscious state as my state of pain.  Then the clause, ‘for S to be in pain is for S to be 
in the same conscious state that I am in when I am in pain’, would not specify a determinate 
condition for the truth of ‘S is in pain’.  On the assumption that there are natural properties, 
however, it is at least arguable that we can appeal to a basic notion of sameness of conscious 
state to specify what it takes for S to be in pain. 
Third, Peacocke claims two advantages for his account of concepts of conscious 
states. In the first place, it explains the uniformity of meaning between first-person and third-
person ascriptions of pain and other conscious states.  Since what it is for someone else to be 
in pain is explained in terms of her being in the same conscious state that I am in when I’m in 
pain, there is no danger that the property of pain that I ascribe to other people might be 
different from the property of pain that I ascribe to myself.10  By contrast: 
other theories, and especially some forms of ‘criterial’ accounts favored by some neo-
Wittgensteinians, have famously had difficulties in explaining how the same thing is 
meant in . . . first-person and third-person psychological ascriptions.11 
A second advantage Peacocke claims for his account is that it explains how it is possible to 
understand the thought that someone else is in pain without knowing what would count as 
evidence that she is in pain.12  He takes it as obvious that understanding third-person 
ascriptions of pain is independent of knowing what counts as evidence that someone else is in 
pain – citing with approval Rogers Albritton’s observation that one might have the concept 
toothache yet simply have ‘no notion how people with toothache [are] likely to behave, these 
days.’13  Wittgensteinian views, Peacocke thinks, again have difficulty in accommodating 
that insight.  
Is Peacocke’s account successful?  Does it offer a viable alternative to Wittgenstein’s 
position? 
                                                 
9  As Peacocke puts it, his account assumes ‘a certain irreducible realism’ about properties (Truly Understood,  
179; all quotations in this paragraph of the main text are taken from that page).  The kind of realism about 
properties that Peacocke has in mind is some version of the natural properties view; that is what is needed if the 
appeal to the notion, ‘same conscious state as this’, is to do the work that he requires. 
10 This explains the point advertised in note 4 above: that, on an account that appeals to identity in answering 
our initial question 2 (‘How do I understand what it is for someone else to be in pain?’), the answer to question 2 
brings with it an answer to question 3 (‘Is the property of pain that I ascribe to others on the basis of what they 
say and do the same as the property I ascribe to myself without evidence?’). 
11 Peacocke, Truly Understood, 165. 
12 Peacocke, Truly Understood, 177. 
13 Rogers Albritton, “On Wittgenstein’s Use of the Term ‘Criterion’,” in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical 
Investigations, ed. G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1968), 248. 
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3. Approaching the middle ground 
We have seen that Wittgenstein’s rejection of natural properties plays a crucial role both in 
his argument against the possibility of defining sensation words by introspective ostension 
and in his argument against the possibility of appealing to identity to explain what it is for 
someone else to be in pain.  So, on the face of it, someone who accepts the doctrine of natural 
properties has a ready way of bypassing Wittgenstein’s concerns about both aspects of the 
model of introspection and identity.  Peacocke’s account of our concepts of conscious states 
takes exactly that route. 
I shall argue, however, that the opposition between Wittgenstein’s anti-platonist 
account of our concepts of sensations and the view of sensation-concepts that is suggested by 
the natural properties view is not as straightforward as it may initially seem.  On the one 
hand, someone who takes the natural-properties view cannot avoid making some appeal to 
our classificatory practices in explaining our concepts of conscious states.  On the other hand, 
the content of Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism needs careful unpacking and, if it is developed in 
a way that preserves common-sense intuitions, there is less distance than there may initially 
seem to be between the Wittgensteinian account of sensation-concepts and the account we get 
from a plausible application of the natural properties view.   
My suggestion is this.  If we start with the natural properties view, we will find 
ourselves moving towards Wittgenstein’s practice-based account of our concepts of 
conscious states.  If we start with Wittgenstein’s anti-naturalist account, we will find 
ourselves moving towards some form of natural properties view.  I do not say that we will 
reach the same position whatever our starting point.  But I do say that we should explore the 
middle ground that lies between an extreme naturalism and an extreme anti-platonism about 
sensation properties: the correct view surely lies somewhere in this middle ground. 
 
3.i From natural properties to classificatory practices  
Suppose we accept the metaphysics of natural properties: any set of things shares, or defines, 
a property; but some properties are objectively more natural than others.  What impact does 
that view about the metaphysical status of properties have on the question, which properties 
our words or concepts pick out?  Lewis’s suggestion is this.  It is possible for a word or 
concept to pick out a highly unnatural property: ‘quus’ and ‘grue’ are examples of that.  But 
relatively natural properties are more eligible referents for our words than less natural 
properties; they are the default referents.  Unless we do something to upset that default (for 
example, by explicitly defining a word so as to pick out a highly unnatural property), our 
words and concepts will pick out relatively natural properties rather than relatively unnatural 
properties.  On this view, the naturalness of properties plays a role in determining the 
reference of our words.  But naturalness does not determine reference all by itself; our 
classificatory practice plays some role, too. 
One reason why practice plays an essential role in determining the reference of our 
word ‘pain’, or our concept pain, even if we accept the metaphysics of natural properties, is 
that someone who feels pain on an occasion has an experience that instantiates a number of 
different properties.  Her sensation is a pain.  But it is something more specific: an intense, 
gnawing toothache.  And it is something more general: a bodily sensation.  Consider an 
account of sensation-concepts like Peacocke’s, on which my grasp of the concept pain is 
anchored in my singling out sensation-properties in the first-person case.  What determines 
which particular property I do single out; what determines that my word ‘pain’, say, applies 
to pains in general, rather than being restricted to toothache?  Peacocke’s answer is, crudely, 
that I am disposed to apply my word ‘pain’ to any sort of pain I feel, and not just to 
toothache; my use of the word is as he puts it ‘keyed to instances in [me] of the property of 
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being a pain’14 rather than instances of some more restricted property.  Even given the 
existence of natural properties, then, the meaning of a sensation term is not established by 
ostension alone; classificatory practice plays a crucial role in determining which property I 
am picking out.15 
Another reason for thinking that classificatory practice must play a role in 
determining the referents of our sensation-terms starts with an example from Wittgenstein: 
A tribe has two concepts, akin to our ‘pain’.  One is applied where there is visible 
damage and is linked with tending, pity etc.  The other is used for stomach-ache, for 
example, and is tied up with mockery of anyone who complains.  ‘But then do they 
really not notice the similarity?’ – Do we have a single concept everywhere where 
there is a similarity?  The question is: Is the similarity important to them?  And need 
it be so?16 
It seems clear that the people in Wittgenstein’s example have legitimate concepts.  Call the 
concept they apply to pain with visible damage pain1 and the concept they apply to pain 
without visible damage pain2.  And suppose that, in the objective hierarchy of naturalness, 
the property of pain is the most natural property that is instantiated in the kinds of 
circumstance in which these people apply their concept pain1 to someone.  Should we say 
that their concept pain1 therefore refers to pain, rather than the more restricted property, 
pain1?  If we interpret their concept that way, we must say that, when they refuse to apply 
their concept pain1 in cases of pain without visible damage, they are simply wrong about the 
extension of the concept.  But that seems highly implausible. The situation seems rather to be 
this.  Our concept pain picks out the property of pain.  The other people’s concept pain1 picks 
out a different property: the property of pain-with-visible-damage.  And the difference 
between the reference of our concept and the reference of theirs is not a matter of any 
difference in the properties that are instantiated in people who belong to the two different 
communities. It is, rather, a matter of the difference between our practice of using our 
concept pain and their practice of using their concept pain1.  As before, even given the 
existence of natural properties, which property a word or concept picks out is in part a matter 
of our classificatory practice.17  Once we see that point in the current case, it seems clear that 
our practice of applying our words in the way we do will have a crucial role in determining 
the reference of our concepts in very many other cases, too.  
For these reasons, then, even if we accept the metaphysics of natural properties, and 
even if we accept that properties that are relatively natural are more eligible referents for our 
words than properties that are less natural, we must also accept that our classificatory 
practices play a vital role in determining which properties our words pick out.  If we start 
from the natural-properties view, we are driven towards the Wittgensteinian view that what it 
takes for one thing to count as similar to another, or as having the same property as another, 
is not dictated by reality itself but depends in part on our classificatory practices. 
 
3.ii From classificatory practices to natural properties  
On Wittgenstein’s view, I said, what it takes for one thing to count as similar to another is not 
determined by reality itself but depends in part on our classificatory practices: on what we 
                                                 
14 Peacocke, Truly Understood, 189. 
15 For a similar stress on the role of recognitional abilities in determining which property I pick out with a 
sensation-concept that I introduce by introspective ostensive definition, see Brian Loar, “Phenomenal States 
(Second Version)”, in The Nature of Consciousness ed. Ned Block et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. 
Nyman, trans. C. Luckhardt and M. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), §638. 
17  Note the obvious similarity between this argument and Burge’s argument about the way in which the 
reference of a term like ‘arthritis’ depends on the social practice of applying it in a particular way (see Tyler 
Burge, “Individualism and the Mental,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV (1979)) 
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find it natural to count as similar to what.  But how exactly does similarity, or sameness of 
property, depend on our practices?  We can distinguish two different ways of developing the 
basic idea.  One development leads to an extreme anti-realism about properties and standards 
of similarity.  The extreme view is certainly distinct from any version of the natural-
properties view.  But it is deeply counterintuitive and it is hard to think that this is the view 
that Wittgenstein intends.  A second way of developing the basic idea leads to a modest 
realism about properties.  That is a plausible view in its own right, and is plausibly ascribed 
to Wittgenstein.  But it appeals to a notion of sameness of property that cannot be spelled out 
in terms of our actual human capacities to classify things as being similar to, or different 
from, one another.  So, I shall argue, even if we start from a Wittgensteinian, practice-based 
conception of properties, we cannot avoid accepting some element of the natural properties 
view. 
Suppose we introduce some word by reference to a set of examples: ‘The word “F” 
applies to this, this, and this, and to anything else that is relevantly similar to these things’.  
The general anti-platonist intuition is that what it takes for something to be relevantly similar 
to the examples is a matter of our classificatory practice.  But how exactly should we 
understand the role of our classificatory practice in defining a standard of similarity? 
The extreme view is that what it takes for a thing to be similar to the examples is 
determined by what we actually judge to be similar when we consider the matter and classify 
the thing as being F or not-F (or what we would judge to be similar if we were to consider it 
and classify it as F or not-F).  Whether or not the application of the word ‘F’ in a particular 
case is correct, then, is directly determined by what we actually say (or would say) when we 
consider that particular case and reach a verdict.  But that is a radically revisionist view.  We 
ordinarily think that whether some word ‘F’ applies to an object depends on two things: the 
meaning that we have given to the word; and the way the object is.  It does not depend on 
what we would in fact say if we were to consider the question and reach a verdict about 
whether or not the object is F.  On the contrary, we think, when we do consider an object and 
judge that it is F, our judgement is true or false in virtue of whether or not the object meets 
the standard of F-ness that we have already laid down.  But the current view explicitly rejects 
that common-sense thought.  Similarly, we ordinarily think that the standards of similarity 
and correctness associated with our words and concepts extend to new cases in a way that is 
not restricted by our actual capacity to apply them.  Our actual human capacities are limited: 
there are calculations that are too large or complex for us to be able to complete; objects that 
are too small or inaccessible for us to be able to observe and classify; environments that are 
too hostile for us to be able to investigate.  But, we think, the standards of similarity and 
correctness that we establish in connection with cases that we are able to calculate or classify 
apply determinately to these other cases.  There is, we think, a fact of the matter about the 
correct result of applying our mathematical operations to a new case, even if it exceeds our 
calculative capacities; there is a fact of the matter about whether some object that is too small 
or inaccessible for us to classify is in fact similar to other things by our standards of 
similarity; and so on.  But, as before, the extreme view rejects that ordinary thought.  If what 
counts as similar to what is determined by what we actually classify (or would classify) as 
similar, our standards of similarity simply do not extend to cases that transcend our 
classificatory capacities.  That is a possible view.  And it is a view that some interpreters have 
ascribed to Wittgenstein.18  But it involves the wholesale rejection of basic elements of our 
                                                 
18  See e.g. Michael Dummett, “Wittgenstein on Necessity: Some Reflections,” in his The Seas of Language 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  Dummett ascribes to Wittgenstein the view that ‘it is only our doing 
[a] calculation and “putting it in the archives” that constitutes its result as being that obtained by doing it 
correctly; so, if we never do that calculation, there is no one correct result’ (Dummett, “Wittgenstein on 
Necessity”, 459).  The view that Dummett attributes to Wittgenstein is even more radical than the position 
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ordinary thought.  If that is the view that Wittgenstein intends, then his image of himself as a 
philosopher who leaves everything as it is seems radically mistaken. 
That is one way of understanding the basic anti-platonist intuition that what it takes 
for one thing to be similar to another is a matter of our classificatory practices.  The 
alternative way of understanding the basic intuition shares the idea that there are numerous 
different possible standards of similarity that are consistent with an initial set of examples.  It 
shares the idea that no one of these possible standards of similarity is objectively the correct 
one, or objectively ‘straighter’ or more natural than any other.  And it shares the idea that 
what ties a word or concept to a particular standard of similarity is that that is the standard 
embodied in the way we find it natural to classify things.  But, on the modest view, once we 
have done enough to single out a particular property by classifying things as similar to, or 
different from, one another in the way we do, there is simply a fact of the matter about 
whether or not something has that property: a fact of the matter that is not determined by how 
we actually classify it when we come to consider the matter (or how we would classify it if 
we were to consider the matter).  Our classificatory practices play a crucial role in 
establishing standards of correctness for our words and concepts.  But the standards we 
establish are not limited by our own actual ability to apply them; there are facts of the matter 
about how our concepts apply to things in cases to which we ourselves are unable to apply 
them.  
It seems fair to say that this modest realism has something in common with the 
natural properties view, insofar as it involves a view of the naturalness or sameness of 
properties on which what it takes for one thing to have the same property as another is not 
limited by our actual human capacities to tell whether or not they have the same property.  
The modest realist insists, for instance, that there is a fact of the matter about whether some 
object that is too small or inaccessible for us to examine has the same property that we 
attribute to objects that we can examine and categorize.  But what does it take for this small 
or inaccessible object to have the same property as the property that we identify in objects 
that we can examine?  It cannot be that we actually classify it (or would classify it) as having 
the same property; for, in the nature of the case, our classificatory capacities do not extend to 
the object in question.  The modest realist’s view must be that, once we have singled out a 
property through our classificatory practice in cases we can consider, there is simply a fact of 
the matter about what it is for a tiny or inaccessible object to have the same property as that.  
And that use of the notion of sameness of property, as I have said, has something significant 
in common with the natural properties view.  The picture is one in which, in picking out the 
properties we do, we latch onto properties that are there anyway: properties whose status as 
genuine properties does not depend on us, our concepts, or our practices of classification.  
That is what allows us to single out properties in a way that extends beyond our own ability 
to identify instances. 
 
 
4. Defending the middle ground. 
I have argued that an adequate account of our concepts of conscious states must occupy a 
middle ground, which gives a role in determining the content of those concepts both to our 
actual classificatory practices and to a notion of naturalness or sameness of properties that 
cannot be understood simply in terms of what we do in fact find it natural to classify as 
similar to what.  And I have suggested that Wittgenstein’s view has just that form.  But does 
                                                                                                                                                        
discussed in the text, since it rules out any appeal to subjunctives about the results we would get if we were to 
do a calculation that no-one ever actually performs. 
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this middle ground really exist?  We can approach that question by considering Peacocke’s 
critique of a ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ view. 
Recall that, on Peacocke’s view of the concept pain, what comes first in the order of 
explanation is the property of pain.  The account appeals to that property at two stages: first, 
in explaining our grasp of the concept pain in the first-person case; and then in explaining 
how we understand ascriptions of pain to other people.  Now Peacocke anticipates a neo-
Wittgensteinian objecting to his account on the grounds that ‘there simply is no property of 
being in pain that has all the characteristics needed by [Peacocke’s] account’.19  ‘Under this 
response’, he says, ‘it is legitimate to speak of the property of being in pain, but this property 
of a mental event must be regarded as a construct out of human conceptual reactions and 
expressive capacities, in a way that is incompatible with its being causally and rationally 
explanatory of thinkers’ first-person judgements that they are in pain’20.  Peacocke argues 
that this neo-Wittgensteinian view is inadequate.  He faces it with a dilemma.  Suppose, first, 
that we treat the property of pain ‘as a construct out of human conceptual reactions and 
expressive dispositions’.  In that case, our account will fail to make sense of the range of 
applications of the concept pain that we actually take to be intelligible.  We can, for instance, 
understand the thought that octopuses, dolphins, and whales feel pain.  But such creatures 
have no ‘distinctively human reactions and expressive dispositions’.  So if we understand the 
property of being in pain as a construct out of such reactions and dispositions, we cannot 
understand the thought that these creatures feel pain.  In response to that horn of the dilemma, 
the neo-Wittgensteinian may offer a different view, saying that ‘a role in human conceptual 
and expressive life’ plays an essential role in singling out the property of pain – in fixing the 
reference of the concept pain – but that ‘the very same conscious property could be 
instantiated by creatures for which it does not have that role’.  But, Peacocke objects, if the 
neo-Wittgensteinian takes that view, the position collapses into a version of Peacocke’s own 
account.  For ‘if there is such a real conscious property that has a nature independently of 
human conceptual reactions and expressions, then it can play a role in making first-person 
judgements rational’, and it can play a role in explaining how we can understand third-person 
ascriptions of pain without knowing what would count as evidence that they were true.  And 
that is just the view that Peacocke is promoting.  
 Care is needed in assessing Peacocke’s objection to the ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ view, 
for two reasons.  On the one hand, as we saw in 3.i, Peacocke’s own account itself gives 
some role to our classificatory practices in specifying exactly which property it is that a 
person picks out in the first-person case, because it gives a role to her disposition to apply the 
word ‘pain’ to all pains she feels, and not simply to a wider, or a more restricted, set of 
feelings.  So Peacocke’s own view is not the most uncompromising application of the 
natural-properties view.  On the other hand, as we saw in 3.ii, the idea that the property of 
pain is an artefact or ‘construct’ of our classificatory practices can be developed in different 
ways: developed one way, it involves a radical anti-realism; developed in another way, it 
leads to a modest form of realism.  I will proceed by considering the effectiveness of 
Peacocke’s complaint considered as an argument against the kind of modest realism about 
properties that I described in section 3.ii.  It may be that that is not exactly the kind of neo-
Wittgensteinian view that Peacocke has in mind.  Since, however, he suggests that every form 
of neo-Wittgensteinianism about properties will be vulnerable to versions of the objections he 
raises, our discussion will certainly be relevant to assessing his argument. 
                                                 
19  Peacocke reports that this objection was suggested to him by Crispin Wright.  The objection is closely related 
to the points I made in section 3.i above. 
20  Peacocke, Truly Understood, 190.  Subsequent quotations in this paragraph of the text are taken from pp. 
190-1 of Peacocke’s book. 
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 The first horn of Peacocke’s dilemma is that, if the neo-Wittgensteinian presses the 
idea that pain is a ‘construct out of human conceptual reactions and expressive dispositions’, 
she will be unable to make sense of ascriptions of pain to certain non-human animals, 
ascriptions that obviously do make sense.  But that criticism seems ineffective against the 
position I have outlined.  Nothing in Wittgenstein’s position requires that a state of some 
other mammal only qualifies as a pain if the creature itself has human-style conceptual 
reactions to pain or expresses pain in exactly the ways that human beings express it.  What 
matters for the intelligibility of ascribing pain and other experiences to creatures of some kind 
is whether the states in question play a role in the creatures’ lives that is sufficiently similar to 
the role that pain plays in our lives.  And a state of a whale or a dolphin can meet that 
standard without the creature needing to have concepts or specifically human interests, and 
without the creature behaving in exactly the ways that humans do.  So Wittgenstein’s view 
does make room for understanding ascriptions of pain and other sensations to non-human 
animals whose lives and behavior are very different from ours.  It is plausible that, when we 
move beyond the simple case of pain, we will quickly reach cases where, on Wittgenstein’s 
approach, the concepts we apply to human beings will not be straightforwardly applicable to 
creatures that lack the dispositions and conceptual capacities that we humans possess.  It is 
hard to see how to make sense of ascriptions of hope or grief, for instance, to creatures whose 
interests, capacities, and reactions are radically different from the kinds of interests, 
capacities, and reactions that we have.21  But that is as it should be: it really is unclear that we 
can make sense of a whale, a cat, or a sheep experiencing grief, envy, hatred, and so on. 
So much for the first horn of the dilemma that Peacocke poses for a neo-
Wittgensteinian view.  What of the second horn: the argument that, if we regard human 
reactions to, and expressions of, pain simply as singling out a property of pain that can play a 
role in causally explaining self-ascriptions of pain, and in making sense of ascriptions of pain 
in cases where we have no idea what would count as evidence for the presence of pain, then 
our position collapses into Peacocke’s version of the natural properties view?  
In the first place, there is no reason why a Wittgenstein view of pain cannot accept 
that the judgement ‘I am in pain’ is a causal response to pain.  It is an obvious, common-
sense truth that we ascribe pain to infants long before they exhibit any linguistic or 
conceptual reactions to pain. Equally obviously, an infant’s being in pain stands in causal 
relations to other events and states of affairs.  It is caused by physical impacts and injuries.  It 
causally affects the child’s future behavior: the burned child avoids the flame because getting 
burned was painful.  And it causally affects other people’s behavior; we treat the child with 
sympathy and concern because she is in pain.  I see nothing in Wittgenstein that conflicts 
with these common-sense truths.  Now consider what happens when the child learns to apply 
the word ‘pain’ to herself.  We teach the child to judge ‘I’m in pain’ in circumstances where 
we already know, on independent grounds, that she is in pain; in doing so, we are teaching 
her to respond to her pain by judging that she is in pain.  Once the teaching has succeeded, 
the response of judging ‘I’m in pain’ is, as Peacocke puts it, ‘keyed to’ the occurrence of pain 
in the child.  There is no reason for a Wittgensteinian to deny that, when the child judges ‘I’m 
in pain’, she makes that judgement because she is in pain.  And there is no reason for her to 
deny that that is a causal because; the child’s judging ‘I’m in pain’ is causally explained by 
her being in pain. 
But recognizing that our self-ascriptions of sensations are causally responsive to the 
sensations we self-ascribe does not undermine the Wittgensteinian idea that our classificatory 
practices play an essential role in determining which properties we pick out.  Recall 
                                                 
21   For brief comments on the cases of hope and grief, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part II 
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Wittgenstein’s example of the people who have two concepts – pain1 and pain2 – where we 
have the single concept pain.  The reference of these people’s terms ‘pain1’ and ‘pain2’ is not 
fixed merely by the nature of the properties instantiated in this community.  What determines 
the reference of the terms is in part their actual classificatory practice.  But that is completely 
compatible with the point that self-ascriptions are causally responsive to occurrences of the 
properties that are thereby self-ascribed.  In Wittgenstein’s imagined community, self-
ascriptions of the form ‘I’m in pain1’ are by and large causally explained by the presence of 
instances of pain1; self-ascriptions of the form ‘I’m in pain2’ are by and large causally 
explained by the presence of pain2.   
In the second place, I have already argued that the Wittgensteinian view, as I have 
characterized it, can accommodate the fact that we can understand third-person ascriptions of 
pain in cases where we have no idea what would count as evidence that someone else is in 
pain.  Our classificatory practice has an essential role to play in determining which property 
we are picking out; but once we have singled out that property, we can go on to make sense 
of ascriptions of the same property in cases that transcend our actual human capacity to tell 
whether or not something has the property.  So I think Peacocke is wrong to suggest that if 
we take that view of properties then we have given up a neo-Wittgensteinian position and 
have instead adopted his own view. 
It might be suggested that my disagreement with Peacocke about the prospects for a 
Wittgensteinian view is a purely verbal one.  On the one hand, it might be claimed, my 
allegedly Wittgensteinian form of modest realism is not a distinctively Wittgensteinian 
position at all but is, rather, a version of the kind of realism about properties that Peacocke 
himself recommends.  On the other hand, it may be suggested, what Peacocke means by a 
‘neo-Wittgensteinian’ position is what I have described as extreme anti-realism about 
properties: the kind of view on which what it is for x to belong to the same kind as y can be 
understood only in terms of how we find it natural to classify x when we actually consider the 
case (or how we would find it natural to classify x if we were to consider the case).  So, the 
suggestion goes, I am not in the end opposing Peacocke’s view that there are really only two 
kinds of position available: an unacceptable anti-realism or constructivism about properties; 
and a sensible form of realism.  The difference is only over where to locate Wittgensteinian 
views in this dichotomy: I think Wittgenstein’s views lead us to the modest realist position; 
Peacocke thinks they lead us to the unacceptably anti-realist position.  Settling that 
disagreement is of course important for the interpretation and assessment of Wittgenstein’s 
views.  But, on this line of thought, there is no substantive philosophical disagreement 
between me and Peacocke.  
This irenic conclusion seems premature, however.  I agree that Peacocke and I are 
maneuvering in the same general area.  We both reject the extreme anti-realist or 
constructivist view of properties.  And we both reject the most radical alternative, on which 
the naturalness of properties determines which properties our words and concepts pick out all 
by itself, with no contribution at all from our classificatory practice.  But, as I said in 3.i, 
Peacocke’s position seems to me to give insufficient recognition to the role of our actual 
classificatory practices in determining which properties our concepts of pain and other 
conscious states pick out.  Different linguistic communities may employ concepts that pick 
out different properties, even if there are no differences in the properties that are actually 
instantiated in those communities’ environments.  We cannot make sense of these differences 
in properties picked out unless we recognize that our classificatory practice plays a larger role 
than Peacocke allows in defining or specifying what counts as sameness of property. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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I suggested at the start of 3.i that, if our account of concepts of conscious states starts from a 
commitment to natural properties, we are bound to recognize on reflection that there is a role 
for our actual classificatory practices in determining which properties our concepts pick out.  
On the other hand, if we start from the anti-platonist idea that the notions of similarity or 
sameness of property must be understood in terms of our classificatory practice, we are 
bound to recognize that we also need a notion of sameness of property that extends beyond 
our limited capacity to apply our own concepts and categories. 
I have argued for three conclusions.  First, that the suggestion just outlined is correct: 
an account of our concepts of conscious states must, as I have put it, occupy the middle 
ground that gives a role both to our classificatory practices and to a notion of sameness or 
naturalness that extends beyond our limited capacities to recognize similarity or sameness of 
property.  Second, that Wittgenstein’s own view is a position of that general kind: in the 
terms of 3.ii, he advances a version of modest realism.  Third, that Peacocke’s objection to 
neo-Wittgensteinian views is unsuccessful.  No doubt there is room for refinement and 
expansion of these conclusions.  But the correctness of these general conclusions – both 
about the location of the right position in this debate and about the form of Wittgenstein’s 
view – seems clear.22 
 
                                                 
22 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference, ‘Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind, and 
Naturalism’, at the University of Bergen in June 2015.  I am grateful to the participants in that conference, and 
especially to the organizers, Kevin Cahill and Thomas Raleigh, for very helpful comments and discussion. 
